Deposed Officials and a Better Comeback Trail

(Caixin Online) A parade of high-ranking government officials has been marched out of office in recent years for a variety of mistakes and miscalculations, some deadly. Held accountable and removed in 2003 for their handling of the SARS outbreak were the nation's health minister, Zhang Wenkang, and a mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong. A year later, then-chairman of PetroChina, Ma Fucai, resigned after accepting responsibility for an explosion at a natural gas well in Chongqing. The list goes on.

Many of these officials were held personally accountable. And yet whether or not they left positions willfully, many returned to high office later. This is the norm in China. Is there a better way?

That's the question before the National People's Congress Standing Committee. On February 24, the committee received a draft amendment of the Administrative Supervision Law. It offers a new plan for forgiving chastised officials.

The amendment says in part that "in cases where punishment is in a form other than a discharge by supervisory organs, where the disciplined person showed repentance during the disciplinary period, and where there has been no recurrence of activity violating administrative laws and regulations, supervisory organs (will) lift punishment and submit written notifications to the disciplined person, his or her work unit and disciplinary administration departments or work units after the discipline period has ended."

The proposed provision means that once a disciplinary period expires, officials can find their soiled career records wiped clean. And that has led to some controversy. Some critics in the media have labeled these "comeback procedures" for "problem officials."

In fact, transfers and promotions of ousted officials whose administrative punishment period has ended involve standard procedures spelled out in the existing Civil Service Act. So why are lawmakers studying an amendment that might complicate matters? The issue is that holding officials accountable in recent years has become more commonplace, but the varied circumstances surrounding their reinstatements have left many questions unanswered.

Re-appointed to different posts after being disciplined in recent years were Zhang, Meng and Ma. Others included a former director of the environment administration, Xie Zhenhua, who resigned after a major pollution incident on the Songhua River in 2005, and the former office director of the State Administration for Quality Supervision Inspection, Li Changjiang, who stepped down after the Sanlu milk powder incident in 2008.

Many similar dismissals and reappointments can be found below provincial and ministerial levels. These include Wang Qin, a former party secretary of Weng'an County dismissed after local riots who later returned to office as vice president for the Qiannanzhou financial bureau. There's also Chen Gong, a former director of the Jinan Railway Bureau, who was removed after a derailment on the Jiaozhou-Jinan line but was later hired as head safety inspector for the Ministry of Railways. Shao Liyong, former director of the Binzhou Administration for Industry and Commerce in Shandong Province, was dismissed for spending public funds to travel during the national mourning period for the Wenchuan earthquake but later resurfaced as director of the same administration in the nearby city of Weihai. Officials punished after incidents involving Fuyang fake milk powder and a Shanxi illegal brick kiln were similarly given new posts.

Because these officials had varying responsibilities, they were held accountable to varying degrees. Each faced unique circumstances that led to a new government job. But in the public's eyes, this personnel process is cloudy. Without clear definitions for the rights and responsibilities of officials, the public has been left to assume that bureaucrats simply protect one another. And they assume that when an official has a problem in one place, he or she can simply transfer to a new location.

In general, Chinese officials can be held politically accountable and legally accountable. The former can require discipline based on the moral responsibility of an official post. The latter can lead to punishment for violating state laws, which includes criminal, administrative and civil liabilities.

For the most part, China's current basis for disciplining officials stems from laws and the Communist Party's policies and regulations for discipline. Relevant are the Administrative Supervision Law and Civil Service Law which outline warnings, varying types of demerits, demotions, dismissals, discharges and other disciplinary methods.

Disciplinary methods for party cadres and leading government cadres can include a mandatory public apology, work suspension during an investigation, admission of responsibility leading to resignation, resignation order, and removal from office. Disciplinary actions include regular and serious warnings, party post removal, probation and party expulsion. There are other ways party members holding public office can be held accountable, too.

Because the cadre management system does not recognize differences between the government and party, and overlooks elements of an overly centralized personnel administration system, these administrative sanctions and disciplinary measures inside the party can be applied separately or in combinations. This makes accountability confusing, and prevents a clear understanding of consequences. No wonder punished former officials reappear in unusual ways.

Officials subjected only to administrative sanctions and not party discipline, and who are "laid off" from administrative positions, can recover their party status. An official subjected only to party discipline without administrative sanctions can "change careers" by moving from a party post to administrative role. Even officials subjected concurrently to administrative sanctions and party discipline can be permitted "a comeback."

In addition to administrative and party positions, government-paid posts are available within the National People's Congress, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, government-run social organizations and numerous other bodies willing to welcome deposed officials.

The public is understandably confused by this system, with its concentrated power over personnel matters and opaque management procedures. And lacking any way to participate in the personnel decision-making or oversight processes, it should be no surprise when the public questions the rapid reappointment of a shamed and dismissed official.

Not only that, but China's current system of combining disciplinary inspection and supervision means the government's administrative supervision organs and the party's discipline inspection organizations are actually running the same show. So without any distinctions between executive government and party agencies, the Administrative Supervision Law is  basically impotent.

The official accountability system must be clarified. Indeed, the selection and oversight system for public officials needs reform. Accountability is good, but it must be reasonable and based on a sound process with legal support.

(Translated by AHK)