By Andy Xie
05.13.2010 18:33
China's Foul Assets, Fouler Yet
Within the government's ambit is a series of policies that could address the momentum of the status quo, so why have they been foundering so far?
Powerful interest groups have paralyzed China's macro policy, with ominous
long-term consequences. Local governments consider high land prices their
lifeline. State-owned enterprises don't want interest rates to rise. Exporters
are vehemently against currency appreciation. China's macro policies have been
reduced to psychotherapy, relying on sound bites and small technical moves to
scare speculators. In the meantime, inflation continues to pick up momentum.
Unless the central government bites the bullet and makes choices, the economy
might experience a disruptive adjustment in the foreseeable
future.
The first key point is that local governments have become
dependent on the property sector for revenue as profits from manufacturing
decline and the need to spend increases. Attracting industry has been the main
means of economic development and fiscal revenue for two decades. Coastal
provinces grew rich by nurturing export-oriented industries. But those economics
have changed in the past five years. Rising costs have sharply curtailed
manufacturers' profits, and most local governments now offer subsidies to
attract industries. The real revenue game has shifted to
property.
Second, preferential lending treatment for state-owned
enterprises has led to their rapid expansion. Most debt on the mainland is owed
by state-owned enterprises. The debts of households and property developers are
really payments to government. Keeping interest rates exceptionally low has
become a national policy for protecting the state sector. Other considerations,
such as inflation, have been suppressed.
Third, China's exporters
are suffering from rising costs and weak global demand. They are vehemently
opposed to currency appreciation. The new labor law, rising tax rates and
tougher environmental standards are their other grievances. They still represent
half of China's manufacturing sector, and are in a position to influence
government policy.
China's current policy mix is another form of
subsidy to the supply side. Low wages and resource prices were the subsidies
before. Now, resource prices are high and wages are rising. High land prices and
low interest rates have become the pillars for the state sector, alleviating the
burden on the export sector. High land prices and low interest rates are really
taxes on the household sector. Essentially, Chinese people have made gains on
wages but lost big on housing affordability and interest income. This situation
shows the state sector is too big, and not efficient enough to survive on market
forces alone. The macro dilemma really reflects structural
problems.
China's policies have travelled the path of least
immediate resistance - monetary expansion and asset inflation. The main purpose
behind asset inflation is that the government can tax it. It provides a place
for people to chase their get-rich-quick dreams and is popular as long as the
market goes up. It also offers insiders who have disproportionate influence to
play the game at the expense of little people. It is no coincidence that China's
policies have been so pro-asset-inflation in the past few
years.
China's asset bubble has probably grown more quickly than
any in the past. The stock of residential properties, works in progress and land
banks may be worth three times the gross domestic product, or about 100 trillion
yuan (HK$ 113.6 trillion). Their value was negligible seven years ago. The ratio
of residential property value to GDP in Beijing and Shanghai is similar to Hong
Kong's in 1997. Their rental yields are also similar to Hong Kong's then. In
addition, the mainland has created a unique phenomenon of empty flats: I suspect
the number is 10-20 million.
When China's bubble bursts, there will
be considerable economic damage. But many in China want to keep the bubble where
it is – not expanding, not shrinking. Yes, government officials are the best and
the brightest in the country. Combined with the nation's size, they have been
able to maintain situations that seem unreal from a market perspective. This has
cultivated the enormous popular faith that the government can get what it wants.
But the longer the market is distorted, the bigger the eventual
payback.
The current round of property tightening relies on credit
restrictions and pressure. The former aims to keep out repeat flat buyers in
favor of first-time buyers. But alas, the price is too high for first-time
buyers. Local governments still have money from last year's property sales and
can continue to spend. But how will they keep the economy going when their money
runs out in a few months? Will the policies be relaxed again? This happened
during previous rounds of tightening.
Beijing can still cope with
the consequences of the bubble bursting, given its enormous assets. But it may
be harder to handle if the bubble continues for two more years. To rein it in,
Beijing must raise interest rates quickly. Some worry that raising rates would
increase the pressure for currency appreciation, but this is probably not true.
The yuan is not undervalued. When the subsidy to manufacturing for asset
inflation is removed, it could be equivalent to a 20 percent appreciation in the
exchange rate.
When asset prices revert to normal levels, China
needs to get its fiscal house in order to prevent the bubble repeating. First,
the government must limit its spending. Local governments' performance is
benchmarked for economic performance, so they will always try to maximize
revenue. This is tied in with the lack of an urbanization strategy. Such a
strategy should be limited to big cities. In other places, governments should be
given social rather than economic mandates.
Second, the tax system
should be unified and simplified. Local governments shouldn't have the authority
to offer tax concessions, either directly or indirectly. Tax competition among
local governments is destructive for the country's revenue base and encourages
overcapacity.
Finally, China must fight corruption in a
life-or-death struggle. Corruption may cost the economy 10 per cent of GDP. If
that were collected in the government's coffers, high property prices would no
longer be needed. The net benefit to government from the asset game and low
interest rates is about 10 per cent of GDP. If the government wants to have its
cake and eat it too, it must fight corruption.